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Public Reporting of Fed Cattle Grid Prices: Policy Reform Consequences

ABSTRACT
Mandatory livestock price reporting was implemented in April 2001. Empirical
evidence indicates a significant change in volatility occurred in publicly reported fed
cattle grid premiums and discounts after its implementation. Empirical analysis of grid
premiums and discounts across the pre-and post-reform periods indicates that increased
transparency is compatible with either an increase or a decrease in price volatility in the
post-MPR period. Furthermore, it appears that the public price reporting system for
weekly grid premiums and discounts failed to provide an adequate level of transparency
prior to the implementation of price reporting reforms.
Our methodology extends the literature on the use of volatility measures for
investigating issues associated with market transparency. This extension can be applied
to the development of volatility measures for monitoring the price reporting behavior of
firms.
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Public Reporting of Fed Cattle Grid Prices: Policy Reform Consequences

The Agricultural News Marketing Service (AMS) has been providing weekly grid
price reports for slaughter cattle since 1996. These reports provide the market with
information on weekly premiums and discounts for quality grade, yield grade, and weight
(Fausti et al 1998). Until April 2001, these price reports were based on information
collected from meat packing companies under a voluntary price reporting (VPR) system.
When the VPR system ended, only six packing firms were providing weekly reports.
After mandatory livestock price reporting (MPR) was implemented, all firms were
required to report. As a result, market transparency is expected to increase due to: a) an
increased number of firms reporting, and b) an increase in the quantity and quality of
information reported by packing firms.
The general perspective on the relationship between transparency and price
dispersion in the MPR literature is: As transparency increases, price dispersion decreases,
which decreases price uncertainty for market participants (e.g. Azzam 2003). The simple
weekly average time-series data for reported grid premiums and discounts (figures 1-4)
show that this supposition may not apply to a number of AMS grid price categories. For
a number of grid categories, there seems to be an increase in dispersion in the post-MPR
period, but for other categories this does not seem to be the case. These findings are a
conundrum. Is increased transparency compatible with increased dispersion?
Previous studies examining the time-series behavior of grid price series, pre- and
post-MPR, also suggest that there is evidence of a change in premium and discount
volatility after MPR was implemented (Priebe 2004; Hogan and Ward 2005). This
empirical puzzle suggests the relationship between the increase in transparency and the
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change in grid price dispersion needs additional investigation. We intend to investigate
this relationship by exploiting the link between price dispersion and price volatility.
The linkage between price discovery, price transparency, market information
flows, price dispersion, and price volatility has received considerable attention in the
market microstructure literature (O’Hara 1995, Calamia 1999). The theory of market
microstructure behavior focuses on the functional structure of a market and its effect on
market participants’ trading behavior. It has been established in this literature that regime
change which increases the level of market transparency can either increase or decrease
the level of price volatility while improving price efficiency (e.g. Madhavan 1996,
Bloomfield and O’Hara 1999).
Our empirical approach is to investigate how regime reform (from VPR to MPR)
affected the volatility of grid premiums and discounts. The stylized facts derived from
the market microstructure literature are used to investigate this issue. The link between
transparency, market information flow, and volatility suggests that volatility is an
appropriate yardstick for examining the effect of regime change on the level of sensitivity
of public grid price reports to changes in current market conditions. Increased price
volatility increases price dispersion. Common measures of price dispersion, such as the
standard deviation, squared deviations from the mean, and the high-low range, are
commonly used proxies in price volatility studies. Our objective is to provide insight,
based on changes in grid premium and discount volatility, on the level of transparency
associated with the current MPR system relative to the VPR system.
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Literature Review of Cattle Marketing Issues
Grid Pricing
The development of a value based marketing system for fed cattle has been a
priority issue for the beef industry since the publication of War on Fat by the Value
Based Marketing Taskforce in 1990 (VBMTF, 1990).1 Today the most successful form
of value based marketing (VBM) for cattle is referred to as “grid pricing” (Fausti et al.
1998).2 The AMS began voluntary public price reporting of national grid premium and
discount prices (the weekly simple average and the high-low range) in October 1996.
The focus in the grid pricing literature has been on the incentive structure of grid
pricing relative to average pricing of slaughter cattle and its potential success of
supplanting the average pricing marketing channel (e.g. Johnson and Ward 2005; Fausti
and Qasmi 2002; Feuz 1999; Fausti and Feuz 1995). Feuz (1999) estimated that there
were at least 25 different price grids being used by the packing industry shortly after the
AMS began issuing public grid price reports. This suggests that packer premium and
discount schedules vary across firms. Feuz (1999) also discussed the practice of large
packing firms adjusting their grid premium and discount schedules based on plant
averages. The implication was that grid premiums and discounts not only varied across
firms but also within a firm. If the VPR system for grid pricing was providing
transparency, then publicly reported data should reflect this attribute.
The success of value based marketing is dependent on transparency and is
important for the long-run sustainability of the beef industry. Comparing pre- and postMPR grid premium and discount values will provide insight on the level of transparency
provided by both reporting systems.
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Mandatory Livestock Price Reporting
The impetus for imposing MPR in U.S. livestock markets was the belief by
producer groups, economists, and government officials that VPR had become ineffective.
Discussion in the literature suggests that increased industrial concentration in the packing
and feedlot industries and increased use of captive supply procurement methods were the
causes for the VPR system’s failure to provide accurate and timely market information to
market participants (e.g. Anderson et al. 1998; Wachenheim and DeVuyst 2001).
Recent empirical studies suggest that MPR has only marginally improved
transparency in the fed cattle cash market (Grunewald et al. 2004; Fausti and Diersen
2004; Pendell and Schroeder 2006). Accordingly, this evidence suggests that the VPR
system was not as inefficient as alluded to in the earlier literature. However, MPR has
resulted in a dramatic improvement in the level of transparency in the captive supply
market (Ward 2006). The grid cash market for cattle is the only AMS public report where
the transparency issue associated with regime change has not been investigated.
Market Microstructures: Stylized Facts
Market Transparency and Volatility
Market transparency is defined as a market environment where all relevant
information on market conditions is publicly available to all market participants in such a
manner as to allow efficient completion of all transactions. Tomek and Robinson (1981)
state that the requirement for transparency in a commodity market is that all market
participants have access to complete and unbiased information on market supply and
demand conditions.
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An extensive discussion of the relationship between the arrival of information on
market conditions and market price volatility can be found in the market microstructure
literature (e.g. Clark 1973, Andersen 1996, Fleisher 2003, Calvo et al. 2005). This
branch of the market microstructure literature has developed a strong theoretical and
empirical linkage between increased information flow and increased price volatility.
According to another branch of this literature, a policy-induced increase in market
transparency can lead to either increased or decreased price volatility (e.g. Madhavan
1996, Bloomfield and O’Hara 1999).
Volatility and the Statistical Range
Considerable resources have been invested in the study of volatility and the
development of stochastic volatility models for financial markets. One of the key issues
investigated in this literature is the identification of an efficient proxy for price volatility.
A range-based measure of volatility over a finite sampling interval have been shown to be
more efficient than other popular volatility proxies, such as squared returns for the period
(Parkinson 1980, Alizadeh et al. 2002, Brandt et al. 2003, Martens and van Dijk 2005).3
Furthermore, Parkinson (1980) demonstrates that the statistical (high-low) range is a
more efficient proxy for volatility than squared returns regardless of interval length.
Methodology
Market Microstructure Behavior and Public Price Reporting
Market microstructure theory addresses the issue of how the short-run behavior of
market participants is affected by the functional structure of an organized market.
Empirical analysis of market microstructures, as reported in the literature, relies primarily
on high frequency data from stock and foreign exchange markets. Functional differences
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across stock exchanges, central banks, government regulatory organizations, etc. provide
the backdrop for studies examining market issues of price transparency, price discovery,
and price volatility.
The implementation of mandatory price reporting in the livestock industry has
changed the functional structure of both the government’s data collection and reporting
procedures and the behavior of firms when they report premiums and discounts to the
government. We assert that the behavior of market price established in the market
microstructure literature provides a reasonable template for investigating the effect of
regime change on government-reported prices for grid premiums and discounts.
Regime Change and Volatility Measures
The passage of MPR regulations altered the institutional structure of public price
reporting of grid premiums and discounts for slaughter cattle in two ways. First, all firms
are obligated to report grid premiums and discounts for all grids on which they purchase
cattle.4 Second, the AMS has the right to audit the weekly reports submitted by firms.
This is expected to impact the behavior of reporting firms. Packer compliance implies
increased diligence in the reporting of grid premiums and discounts to the AMS and
should increase the quantity and quality of information being reported. Policy reform is
expected to enhance the ability of the public price reporting system to provide greater
transparency in the post-MPR period.
Regime change from VPR to MPR is expected to affect the public price reporting
data series in two ways: a) a sample size effect, and b) an information flow effect. The
sample size effect refers to an increase in the number of firms reporting. The information
flow effect is defined as an increase in the quantity and quality of information each firm
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provides to the AMS. Both of these policy reform effects will alter the level of volatility
of reported grid premiums and discounts. We propose to use two volatility proxies: a) the
standard deviation of a grid category’s weekly average, and b) the weekly high-low range
of a grid category.
Increasing the number of firms providing information to the AMS under MPR is
analogous to increasing the sample size. As the number of firms reporting information
increases, ceteris paribus, the sample standard deviation of a price series is expected to
decline in the post-MPR period. Therefore the sample size effect is expected to reduce
the level of volatility (measurement error) reflected in the standard deviation. As the
proportion of firms reporting increases, ceteris paribus, the high-low range increases. If
the quality and quantity of information provided by each firm has not changed, then the
increase in the high-low range reflects greater statistical precision in identifying extreme
points in a distribution, not increasing volatility.
An increase in the flow of information into the public price reporting system,
ceteris paribus, is expected to increase the level of volatility of the price series publicly
reported in a manner consistent with the market microstructure literature (Clark 1973,
Anderson 1996, Fleischer 2003). Holding the number of firms reporting constant, our
proxies for volatility, the high-low range and the standard deviation, are expected to
increase as the quality and quantity of information increases.
Implementation of MPR is expected to increase sample size as well as increase
the quality and quantity of market information reported to the government. The increase
in sample size is expected to decrease volatility, and the increase in information flow is
expected to increase volatility.
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We can not ascertain if a change in the post-MPR level of the intra-weekly highlow range is the result of the increased sample size or the increased information flow. The
standard deviation (σ) can be useful in answering this question. The answer to this
question will help reveal which publicly reported grid premium and discount categories
may have lacked transparency prior to regime change.
Empirical Test I: Sampling Effect versus Information Flow Effect
The goal of the first empirical procedure is to determine if the sampling effect or
information flow effect dominates in the post-MPR period. The statistical procedure has
two components, a) a difference in means hypothesis test to compare pre- and post-MPR
intra-weekly range grid categories, and b) a difference in variance hypothesis test to
compare pre- and post-MPR grid category standard deviations.
Due to policy reform, increased transparency will result from, ceteris paribus, an:
a) increase in the proportion of firms reporting; and b) increase in the quantity and quality
of information reported. We hypothesize that both of these effects will cause the mean
intra-weekly range (μ) for the post-MPR period to increase relative to the pre-MPR
period for all grid premium and discount series. Hypothesis I tests the null of a decline or
no change in the mean value of the intra-weekly range against the alternative that it
increased in the post-MPR period.
Hypothesis 1:
HO: post μ ≤ pre μ
H1: post μ > pre μ
We expect that the sample standard deviation (σ) of grid premium or discount
category weekly average to decline in the post-MPR period relative to the pre-MPR

9

period as the proportion of firms reporting increases, ceteris paribus. But we also expect
that an increased flow of information will increase the standard deviation in the post
period. Thus we do not have an a prior assumption on the effect of regime change on the
standard deviation. Hypothesis II tests the null of a decrease in the sample standard
deviation (σ) of a grid premium or discount weekly average against the alternative of no
change or an increase in the post-MPR period.
Hypothesis 2:
HO: post σ < pre σ.
H1: post σ > pre σ.
If the null for hypothesis 1 is rejected and the null for hypothesis 2 is accepted,
then we can only conclude that the regime change has not increased information flow and
the increase in the high-low range is the result of an increase in the number of firms
reporting. This implies the sampling effect dominates the information flow effect. This
would be consistent with previous theoretical work on MPR by Azzam (2003). Azzam
suggests that MPR should improve transparency by reducing uncertainty (as measured by
the standard deviation) surrounding public price reports for spot market transactions.
Under this scenario (scenario one), regime change increases market transparency by
increasing the number of firms reporting information but reduces volatility reflected in
public price reporting grid categories. In this case the increase in the high-low range
reflects the increase in the number of firms reporting, not an increase in information flow.
Scenario one suggests that the VPR system was providing a less precise level of reporting
accuracy to the market because there is no evidence of increased information flow in the
post MPR period. In this case, policy reform has a positive but marginal impact on
transparency due to increased reporting accuracy.
10

If the nulls for both hypotheses 1 and 2 are rejected, then we can conclude that
regime change has not only increased the number of firms reporting market information
but has also increased market information flow. In this case (scenario two), regime
change increases transparency by increasing the number of firms reporting and increasing
the level of market information flow. Scenario two implies that policy reform has had a
significant and positive impact on market transparency. Empirical evidence supporting
scenario two indicates that the VPR system failed to provide timely and accurate
information to the market.
Scenario two is not predicted in the MPR literature and raises an interesting
question. If statistical evidence suggests that that there has been an increase in price
report volatility as a result of MPR, then is it possible to identify the source for this
increase in volatility? Identifying a linkage between premium and discount volatility and
variables reflecting market conditions can support the proposition that increased volatility
is the result of increased market information flow. Establishing a linkage between
increased market information flow and increased volatility can provide an answer to the
conundrum revealed in the work of Priebe (2004); and Hogan and Ward (2005).
Location and Dispersion Testing Methodology
Data diagnostics were performed to evaluate the statistical characteristics of the
pre- and post-MPR grid data collected on the intra-weekly range and the weekly simple
average for grid premiums and discounts. The Anderson-Darling normality test (Gujarati
2003, p.147) was used to evaluate the normal distribution assumption. All of the pre- and
post-MPR variables failed the normality test. To conduct hypothesis test one, we
selected the nonparametric Wilcoxon Two-Sample Rank Sum test for location (SAS
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1990, pp. 127 and 1196). The non-parametric Brown-Forsythe equality of variance test
was selected for hypothesis test two because it is not dependent on the assumption of
equal location parameters (Brown and Forsythe 1974).
Empirical Test II: Identifying Sources of Increased Information Flow
The goal of the second empirical procedure is to determine if an empirical
relationship can be identified between the pre- and post-intra-weekly range, and variables
reflecting market conditions in the slaughter cattle market. The variables selected are: a)
the national beef carcass price, b) the weekly proportion of steers grading at least quality
grade choice and yield grade 3, and c) the national weekly average slaughter weight of
steers sold live. Comparing the strength of the empirical linkage between a premium and
discount volatility proxy and variables reflecting market conditions in the pre- and postMPR periods will provide insight on the ability of the VPR system to provide
transparency.
AMS reported grid premiums and discounts represent the market value of
particular carcass characteristics. The market value of these carcass characteristics
should be influenced by supply and demand conditions in the national market for beef. In
order for grid pricing to be a more efficient conduit for the transmission of consumer
preferences for a particular type of beef product back to the beef producer, grid premium
and discounts must reflect current supply and demand conditions in the market for beef.
Theoretically, the interaction between grid premiums and discounts and general
market conditions should revolve around an equilibrium relationship between weekly
grid prices and the market variables that reflect demand and supply conditions. Therefore,
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changes in market conditions imply new information has been introduced into the market
and this in turn should affect the level of volatility of grid prices.
We propose that the technique of cointegration is an appropriate method to test if
equilibrium relationships exist between the intra-weekly grid premium and discount
statistical range and the market variables selected to reflect supply and demand
conditions in the beef market. A comparison of cointegration results across grid premium
and discount categories (pre- and post-MPR) will provide additional insight on whether
the VPR system failed to provide an adequate level of transparency to the market.
Cointegration theory postulates that if a linear combination of two nonstationary
time series variables is found to be stationary, then the relationship between those two
variables is considered to be in an equilibrium relationship (Gujarati 2003). We propose
to test hypothesis three for each of the pre- and post-MPR grid premium and discount
intra-weekly range series. Each series will be individually regressed upon: a) the national
beef carcass price, b) the weekly proportion of steers grading at least quality grade choice
and yield grade 3, and c) the national weekly average slaughter weight of steers sold live.
Hypothesis 3
HO: The residual of the cointegration regression is nonstationary.
H1: The residual of the cointegration regression is stationary.
If the null hypothesis is rejected, this suggests that there is evidence of an
equilibrium relationship between a grid discount or premium series (pre- or post-MPR)
and the selected market variable. In this case, we would conclude that premium or
discount volatility is affected by the flow of market information on supply and demand
conditions. If the null hypothesis is accepted, then we would conclude there is no
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evidence of a relationship between premium or discount volatility and the flow of market
information on supply and demand conditions embodied in the selected market variable.
Evidence of a cointegrating relationship in the post-MPR period and no
relationship in the pre-MPR period for a specific premium or discount series would
suggest that VPR failed to provide an adequate level of transparency to the market.
Cointegration Methodology
Data diagnostics were preformed on the pre- and post-MPR grid premium and
discount date collected on the intra-weekly range. The Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test
(SAS/ETS, 1999, pp.361-63) was conducted on pre- and post-MPR data: a) intra-weekly
Range, b) 5 Area Weekly Weighted Average dressed weight price of slaughter cattle (35%
to 65% choice), c) the weekly regional grading percentage from regions 7&8, and d) the
5 Area Weekly Weighted Average for live slaughter steer weight. In the pre-MPR data
set, all of the series are nonstationary except the select and Yg 3.5-4.0 series. In the postMPR data set, all of the series are nonstationary except Yg 3.0-3.5 and Yg 3.5-4.0.
Each of the nonstationary pre- and post-yield and quality grade series were
regressed on hot carcass weight price and then on the regional grading percentage. Each
of the nonstationary pre-and post-discount weight series were regressed on hot carcass
weight price and then on the weekly live slaughter weight. Cointegration tests were
preformed using the Phillips-Ouliaris Cointegration Test (SAS/ETS, 1999, p.363). The
critical values for the Z tau statistics are from Phillips and Ouliaris (1990, p.190, Table II
a-b-c). Unit root and cointegration tests were adjusted for serial correlation.
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Data
Public Price Reporting of Grid Premiums and Discounts: Pre and Post MPR
The AMS began issuing weekly grid premium and discount reports out of its Des
Moines, Iowa, office in 1996. The VPR data collection process in the Des Moines office
consisted of weekly phone calls from the AMS reporter to packers on Monday morning.
Packers provided their premium and discount schedules for the week. No auditing or
verification procedures were conducted to confirm the reliability of the data.5
After MPR, the St. Joe, MO, office of the AMS was given the responsibility of
collecting packer grid premium and discount data. The St. Joe office considers its
premium and discount reports to be distinctly different from the reports issued under the
old reporting regime. Packers under MPR are required to submit a Cattle Premiums and
Discount Weekly Report (form # LS-177) by 2 pm Monday of each week. This report
must be filed by each packing plant that purchases cattle on a grid. The St. Joe office
tabulates the reported data and issues a public report each Monday. The report contains
essentially the same premium and discount categories and provides the weekly simple
average mean and range for each category. The St. Joe office is also responsible for the
auditing of reports to ensure packer compliance.6 The structure of the new reporting
regime suggests that the packing industry will be more diligent in providing accurate
weekly premium and discount reports to the St. Joe office.
Data Sources
Data on national slaughter cattle grid premium and discount values were collected
from an AMS publication (USDA-AMS: the National Carcass Premiums and Discounts
for Slaughter Steers and Heifers weekly report). The data set also includes: a) the 5 Area
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Weekly Weighted Average dressed weight price of slaughter cattle (35% to 65% choice)
and the 5 Area Weekly Weighted Average for live slaughter steer weight (USDA-AMS:
the Livestock, Meat and Wool Weekly Summary and Statistics weekly reports); and b) the
weekly regional grading percentage from region 7&8 (USDA-AMS: National Steer &
Heifer Estimated Grading Percent weekly report). The data series cover the period from

January 6, 1997 to March 14, 2005.
The time series data was not adjusted for inflation. It was decided that the
conversion process would also affect variability in the data. Given that the objective of
this research is to investigate volatility in pre- and post-MPR for AMS reported grid
premium and discounts series, this seems to be a reasonable course of action.
Empirical Results
Location and Dispersion Test Results
Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the pre- and post-intra-weekly range
and the p-values for the one-sided Wilcoxon test for location. The test results indicate
strong empirical evidence supporting the alternative hypothesis that the intra-weekly
range is greater in the post-MPR period relative to the pre-MPR period.7 The only
exception is the Yg 3.5-4.0 category.
Table 2 contains the summary statistics for the pre- and post-weekly simple
average grid premium and discount standard deviations, and the p-values for the equality
of variance tests. The test results provide strong empirical evidence for rejecting the null
hypothesis that the post-MPR period standard deviations are lower than in the pre-MPR
period for the quality grade categories, the yield grade premium categories, and the
lightweight discount categories. Examining the standard deviation data, it appears that
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for the yield grade discount categories Yg 3.0-3.5, Yg 3.5-4.0, and the heavyweight
discount category W 950-1000 there was not a statistically significant change in variance
as a result of regime change. However, for the yield grade discount categories Yg 4.05.0, Yg >5.0, and the heavyweight discount category W >1000, there was a statistically
significant decline in variance as a result of regime change.
The location and dispersion test results collectively show statistical evidence to
support the conclusion that regime change resulted in an increase in the flow of
information into the public grid price reports beyond the level expected from an increase
in the number of firms reporting for the following categories: a) the yield grade premiums
categories, b) the quality grade premium and discount categories, and c) the lightweight
discounts categories. The empirical results for these categories are consistent with
scenario two. Policy reform increased transparency by increasing information flow,
which increased price report volatility. This implies that for these grid categories, the
VPR system failed to provide an adequate level of transparency.
It is interesting that the only categories for which we did not find evidence of
increased information flow are the yield grade discount and the heavyweight discount
categories. The empirical results for these categories are consistent with scenario one.
Increased transparency and diminished price report volatility suggest that these discount
categories may have experienced a greater level of market information flow relative to
other premium and discount categories during the pre-MPR period. This implies that
discount categories were responsive to changing market conditions in the pre-MPR
period. This pre-MPR attribute may have contributed to the producer view that grid
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pricing seemed to be a system of discounts only (Fausti et al. 1998; Fausti and Qasmi
2002).
Cointegration Results: Scenario One
Only grid yield and weight discount categories were identified as having greater
transparency and less volatility in the post-MPR period. Yield grade discounts were
regressed on HCWP and then on regional grading percentage for the pre- and postperiods. Heavyweight discounts were regressed on HCWP and then on weekly average
slaughter weight for the pre- and post-periods. Analysis of the residuals of the
cointegration equations (Tables 3&4) indicates that: a) deep yield discount categories had
a long-run equilibrium relationship with the selected market variables in both the pre- and
post-MPR periods and this relationship strengthened in the post-MPR period; b) the slight
yield grade discount residuals were stationary in the post period and so no conclusion can
be drawn; and c) heavyweight discounts had a long-run equilibrium relationship with the
selected market variables in both the pre- and post-MPR periods and this relationship
strengthened in the post-MPR period.
We conclude that the voluntary system for reporting these grid discounts was
providing a measure of transparency to the market, but policy reform did improve the
level of transparency. This conclusion is based on improved tau statistics in the postMPR period.
Cointegration Results: Scenario Two
Grid quality grade premium and discount categories, grid yield premium
categories, and lightweight discount categories were identified as having greater volatility
in the post-MPR period. Quality grade premiums and discounts and yield premiums were
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regressed on HCWP and then on regional grading percentage for the pre- and postperiods. Lightweight discounts were regressed on HCWP and then on weekly average
slaughter weight for the pre- and post-periods. Analysis of the residuals of the
cointegration equations (Tables 3-5) indicates that: a) yield grade 1.0-2.0 premium had a
long-run equilibrium relationship with the selected market variables in post-MPR period
but not the pre-MPR period; b) yield grade 2.0-2.5 premium did not have a long-run
equilibrium relationship with the selected market variables in either the pre-MPR period
or post-MPR period; c) yield grade 2.5-3.0 premium did have a long-run equilibrium
relationship with HCWP but not regional grading percentage in both the pre-and postMPR periods; d) prime quality grade premium did not have a long-run equilibrium
relationship with the selected market variables in either the pre-MPR period or post-MPR
period; e) select discount has a long-run equilibrium relationship in the post-MPR period,
but this series was stationary in the pre-MPR period so no comparison can be made; f)
standard discount had a long-run equilibrium relationship with the selected market
variables in post-MPR period but not the pre-MPR period; and g) lightweight discounts
had a long-run equilibrium relationship with the selected market variables in the postMPR period but not the pre-MPR period.
The empirical results suggest that the VPR system for these grid premium and
discount categories was not providing transparency and did not reflect changing market
conditions in the pre-MPR period. We surmise that the increase in grid premium
volatility in the post-MPR period is a result of market information now being reflected in
weekly grid reports.
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Overall, the cointegration results indicate that grid premium and discounts have a
stronger relationship to market conditions in the post-MPR period relative to the preMPR period. Evidence also suggests that discounts have a stronger link to market
conditions in the pre and post-MPR periods relative to grid premiums. We conclude that:
a) regime change was necessary, and b) grid marketing still appears to rely more on
discounts for evaluating cattle.
Summary:
Statistical evidence suggests that a policy-induced increase in transparency is
compatible with an increase or decrease in volatility. However, increased transparency
has come at the cost of increased volatility for grid premiums, and this suggests a lack of
transparency in the pre-MPR period.
It appears that only discounts were influenced by market conditions in the preMPR period. This suggests that the producer complaints about the grid pricing system
being a system of “discounts only” may have been valid. Even though the new public
price reporting mechanism is providing greater transparency, discounts levied by packers
continue to be more responsive to changes in market conditions than premiums in the
post-MPR period. This conclusion raises concern over the effectiveness of the grid
pricing system as a value based system for fed cattle. It appears that the grid incentive
mechanism still has a negative bias.
The methodology presented in this paper extends the empirical literature on the
use of volatility measures to investigate the issue of market transparency. One potential
extension of this methodology is to use volatility measures to monitor price reporting
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behavior of firms to see if firm reporting behavior is consistent with current market
conditions.
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Endnotes:
1. In the late 1980s, The National Cattlemans Beef Association (NCBA) sanctioned
the formation of the Valued Based Marketing Taskforce to study the competitive
position of beef. The taskforce issued a white paper in 1990 titled War on Fat.
The taskforce identified average pricing of slaughter cattle in the cash market as a
major barrier to the transmission of consumer preferences for leaner beef product
with greater quality consistency back to the producer via the price mechanism.
For an expanded discussion on the issue of value based marketing for slaughter
cattle see Cross and Savell (1994) and Fausti et al. (1998).
2. Grid pricing typically accesses carcass premiums and discounts based on carcass
quality grade, carcass yield grade, and hot carcass weight. The concept of grid
pricing evolved from the traditional grade and yield pricing system. The AMS
weekly public report provides prices for quality grade (prime, select, standard),
yield grade( Yg 1.0-2.0, Yg 2.0-2.5, Yg 2.5-3.0, Yg 3.0-3.5, Yg 3.5-4.0, Yg 4.05.0, Yg >5), and weight discounts based on hot carcass weight (400-500, 500-550,
950-1000, over 1000 lbs). See Fausti et al. (1998) for an expanded discussion.
3. Alizadeh et al. (2002) demonstrate that the log range is also an efficient proxy for
volatility and also has the property of being Gaussian as opposed to other
volatility proxies such as squared returns or absolute log of returns.
Unfortunately, the AMS grid data has a number of premium and discount
categories with zero being either the high or low range value. We would be
unable to analyze the yield grade 2.5 to yield grade 4 categories and lose a
significant number of select discount observations using the range of log prices.
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However, another advantage of range based volatility proxies relative to others is
that they are “ …much less contaminated by measurement error” (p.1086).
4. Only packers slaughtering over 125,000 annually are required to report to the
AMS.
5. The AMS data collection procedure was verified by the authors via a personal
phone call made on July 15, 2005, to the Des Moines, Iowa, office.
6. It is the view of the AMS that packers are providing the actual premium and
discount schedule they will be using for the week when the packers file their
reports Monday morning.
7. When examining the means of the pre- and post-weekly premiums and discounts
across periods we find; the change in the price level is relatively small when
compared to the change in intra-weekly range across periods. This suggest that
the change in the intra-weekly range across periods can not be simply explained
as being caused by the mean change in the price level of a premium or discount
across periods.
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Table 1: Pre- and Post-MPR Grid Intra-Weekly Statistical Range for Premiums and
Discounts (Summary Statistics).a
Pre MPR
(N=219)
Grid Category
Prime
Select
Standard
Yg 1.0-2.0
Yg 2.0-2.5
Yg 2.5-3.0
Yg 3.0-3.5
Yg 3.5-4.0
Yg 4.0-5.0
Yg >5.0
W 400-500
W 500-550
W 950-1000
W >1000

Mean
7.598
2.358
16.464
3.945
2.012
2.042
0.961
1.000
10.671
10.675
16.863
13.429
13.849
17.091

Std.
2.178
1.126
4.665
1.520
0.360
0.356
0.125
0.000
2.169
2.173
2.036
1.507
2.294
2.527

Post MPR
(N=206)
Mean
18.351
8.008
20.554
7.887
4.307
4.246
0.907
0.931
14.648
15.043
34.612
29.458
17.692
23.617

a

Std.
6.633
3.885
3.560
0.382
1.129
1.162
0.510
0.622
3.721
2.740
2.059
3.166
3.531
3.653

See SAS (1990, pp.127 and 1196) for a discussion of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.
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Two Sample Wilcoxon Rank
Sum test for Location:
P Values = α/2
HO: μpost ≤ μpre
H1: μpost > μpre
PV < 0.001
PV < 0.001
PV < 0.001
PV < 0.001
PV < 0.001
PV < 0.001
PV=0.136
PV> 0.999
PV < 0.001
PV < 0.001
PV < 0.001
PV < 0.001
PV < 0.001
PV < 0.001

Table 2: Pre- and Post-MPR Grid Weekly Simple Average for Premiums and Discounts
(Summary Statistics).a
Pre MPR
(N=219)
Grid Category
Prime
Select
Standard
Yg 1.0-2.0
Yg 2.0-2.5
Yg 2.5-3.0
Yg 3.0-3.5
Yg 3.5-4.0
Yg 4.0-4.5
Yg >5
W 400-500
W 500-550
W 950-1000
W >1000

Mean
5.62
-7.54
-17.42
1.89
0.88
0.88
-0.15
-0.30
-15.38
-20.55
-21.46
-17.36
-16.13
-21.47

Std.
0.49
3.16
2.61
0.32
0.093
0.093
0.024
0.026
1.87
1.75
0.97
0.98
1.63
2.038

Post MPR
(N=206)
Mean
6.43
-9.29
-17.58
2.85
1.65
1.27
-0.0785
-0.080
-12.77
-18.24
-22.83
-15.25
-7.35
-17.51

a

Std.
1.61
4.56
3.96
0.37
0.23
0.18
0.033
0.041
1.071
0.812
1.714
1.487
1.602
1.517

Brown-Forsythe test
for Dispersion:
P Values = α
HO: σpost < σpre
H1: σpost >σpre
PV< .0001
PV=0.0165
PV=0.002
PV=0.057
PV< .0001
PV< .0001
PV=0.359
PV=0.373
PV> 0.99
PV> 0.99
PV< .0001
PV< .0001
PV=0.274
PV> 0.99

See Brown and Forsythe (1974) for the robustness of the equality of variance test under nonnormality.
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Table 3. Yield Grade: Pre- and Post-MPR Grid Weekly Intra-Weekly Range
Cointegration Results.
(Phillips-Ouliaris Z-Tau Critical Values: Tables II a-b-c)
Post MPR (N=206)

Pre MPR (N=219)

P-O
P-O
P-O
P-O
Cointegrating
Residual
Z-Tau
Coint Test
Residual
Z-Tau
Coint Test
a
b
Regression
Unit Root Test
Stat
P-Value
Unit RootTest
Stat
P-Value
Yg 1.0-2.0/HCWP:
ZMean
Stationary
-4.47
P< 0.01
Smean and
NA
NA
SMean
Stationary
-4.45
P< 0.01
Trend NonTrend
Stationary
-4.43
P< 0.01
Stationary
Yg 1.0-2.0/Grade%:
ZMean
Stationary
-4.36
P< 0.01
Z/Smean and
NA
NA
SMean
Stationary
-4.35
P< 0.01
Trend NonTrend
Stationary
-4.39
P< 0.01
Stationary
Yg 2.0-2.5/HCWP:
ZMean
Trend nonNA
Trend nonNA
NA
NA
SMean
stationary
stationary
Trend
Yg 2.0-2.5/Grade%:
ZMean
Smean nonNA
Smean and
NA
NA
NA
SMean
stationary
Trend NonTrend
Stationary
Yg 2.5-3.0/HCWP:
ZMean
Stationary
-3.32
P< 0.025
Stationary
-3.15
P< 0.025
SMean
Stationary
-3.31
P< 0.075
Stationary
-3.14
P< 0.10
Trend
Stationary
-3.54
P< 0.10
Stationary
-3.20
P> 0.15
Yg 2.5-3.0/Grade%:
ZMean
Smean nonNA
Trend nonNA
SMean
stationary
stationary
NA
NA
Trend
Yg 3.0-3.5/HCWP:
ZMean
NA
NA
NA
Stationary
-3.75
P< 0.01
SMean
Stationary
-3.74
P< 0.025
Trend
Stationary
-3.76
P< 0.05
Yg 3.0-3.5/Grade%:
ZMean
NA
NA
NA
Stationary
-3.42
P< 0.01
SMean
Stationary
-3.41
P< 0.05
Trend
Stationary
-3.41
P< 0.125
Yg 3.5-4.0/HCWP:
ZMean
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
SMean
Trend
Yg 3.5-4.0/Grade%:
ZMean
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
SMean
Trend
Yg 4.0-5.0/HCWP:
ZMean
Stationary
-5.68
P< 0.01
Stationary
-3.86
P< 0.01
SMean
Stationary
-5.66
P< 0.01
Stationary
-3.85
P< 0.025
Trend
Stationary
-5.68
P< 0.01
Stationary
-3.92
P< 0.05
Yg 4.0-5.0/Grade%:
ZMean
Stationary
-4.83
P< 0.01
Stationary
-4.25
P< 0.01
SMean
Stationary
-4.82
P< 0.01
Stationary
-4.24
P< 0.01
Trend
Stationary
-5.66
P< 0.01
Stationary
-4.24
P< 0.025
Yg >5.0/HCWP:
ZMean
Stationary
-6.48
P< 0.01
Stationary
-3.85
P< 0.01
SMean
Stationary
-6.46
P< 0.01
Stationary
-3.84
P< 0.025
Trend
Stationary
-6.42
P< 0.01
Stationary
-3.91
P< 0.05
Yg >5.0/Grade%:
ZMean
Stationary
-6.46
P< 0.01
Stationary
-4.28
P< 0.01
SMean
Stationary
-6.44
P< 0.01
Stationary
-4.27
P< 0.01
Trend
Stationary
-6.42
P< 0.01
Stationary
-4.26
P< 0.025
a
Zmean refers to no drift, Smean is with drift, and Trend refers to a trend component. NA refers to not applicable. If
the residuals of a regression are found to be nonstationary, then NA is assigned to Z-tau and Pvalue columns. The
pre- and post-3.5-4 series is stationary and so is the pre 3-3.5 series and thus a cointegration test is NA.
b
Residual unit roots test were conducted using a critical value of 10%.
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Table 4. Weight Discount: Pre- and Post-MPR Grid Weekly Intra-Weekly Range
Cointegration Results.
(Phillips-Ouliaris Z-Tau Critical Values: Table II a-b-c)
Post MPR (N=206)
Cointegrating Regressiona
W 400-500/HCWP:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
W 400-500/Livewt:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
W 500-550 /HCWP:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
W 500-550/Livewt:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
W 950-1000/HCWP:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
W 950-1000/lLivewt:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
W >1000/HCWP:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
W >1000/Livewt:
ZMean
SMean
Trend

Tau Stat
-8.28

-8.49

-6.51

-6.40

-3.97

-4.07

-6.08

-5.49

P-value
P< 0.01

P< 0.01

P< 0.01

P< 0.01

P< 0.01

P< 0.01

P< 0.01

P< 0.01

a

Pre MPR (N= 219)
Tau Stat
-2.42

-2.08

-5.10

-4.11

-3.37

-3.62

-3.57

-3.81

Zmean refers to no drift, Smean is with drift, and Trend refers to a trend component.
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P-value
P> 0.15

P> 0.15

P< 0.01

P< 0.01

P< 0.05

P< 0.05

P< 0.05

P< 0.01

Table 5. Quality Grade: Pre- and Post-MPR Grid Weekly Intra-Weekly Range Cointegration
Results.
(Phillips-Ouliaris Z-Tau Critical Values: Tables II a-b-c)
Post MPR (N=206)

Cointegrating
a
Regression
Prime/HCWP:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
Prime/Grade%:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
Select /HCWP:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
Select/Grade%:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
Standard/HCWP:
ZMean
SMean
Trend
Standard/Grade%:
ZMean
SMean
Trend

P-O
Residual
b
Unit Root Test
Trend nonstationary

Zau
Stat

NA

Pre MPR (N= 219)

P-O
Coint test
P-value
NA

P-O
Residual
Unit Root Test
Smean and
Trend NonStationary
Smean and
Trend NonStationary

Zau
Stat

P-O
Coint Test
P-value

NA

NA

NA

NA

Trend nonstationary

NA

Stationary
Stationary
Stationary

-4.48
-4.47
-5.12

P< 0.01
P< 0.01
P< 0.01

NA

NA

NA

Stationary
Stationary
Stationary

-4.21
-4.39
-5.57

P< 0.01
P< 0.01
P< 0.01

NA

NA

NA

Stationary
Stationary
Stationary

-5.87
-5.85
-6.11

P< 0.01
P< 0.01
P< 0.01

Smean and
Trend NonStationary

NA

NA

Stationary
Stationary
Stationary

-5.62
-5.50
-6.28

P< 0.01
P< 0.01
P< 0.01

Smean and
Trend NonStationary

NA

NA

NA

a

Zmean refers to no drift, Smean is with drift, and Trend refers to a trend component. NA refers to not applicable. If
the residuals of a regression are found to be non stationary , then NA is assigned to Z-tau and Pvalue columns. The
pre-MPR Select series is stationary and thus a cointegration test is NA.
b
Residual unit roots test were conducted using a critical value of 10%.
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Fig 1. Premiums and discounts for grades
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Fig 2. Premiums for yield
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Fig 3. Discounts for yield categories
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Fig 4. Discounts for weight categories
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